An emerging branch of political theory, "the politics of dissensus," starts out from the premise that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think that the political philosophy inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplements each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political studies ought to enlighten each other.
The assumed realistic utopia simplifies my analysis and it is justified by the fact that if it is correct that politics -as circumscribed by the collection of papers in The Politics of Dissensus
-is an essential feature of democratic well-ordered societies with a strong parliamentary system, politics is present in any constitutional democracy of that kind. My main point is that political liberalism gives a model for the logic and limits of deliberation and it is not a consensus theory of politics.
I begin by introducing main features of the politics of dissensus (Part II). I then show that the overlapping consensus that lies at the heart of political liberalism is not itself the result of deliberation (Part III). After this, I argue that political liberalism is coherent with the view on parliamentary deliberation developed by the politics of dissensus (Part IV). In the fifth part, I turn to the so-called "Conversational model" of deliberation. I demonstrate that even if political liberalism accepts this model, which is a question I leave open, it does not mean that failing to reach a consensus signals that the debaters have not tried hard enough or have not been sincere, or anything like that. It all depends on one's take on the idea of the "force of the 4 better argument." I provide some comments on the normative idea of public reason and I introduce a topic for an empirical parliamentary study that I believe would enlighten the present speculations.
II: The Politics of Dissensus
In the introduction to their recent book, Kari Palonen, José María Rosales and Tapani Turkka boldly state that
The Politics of Dissensus argues a novel perspective on the study of parliamentary politics. Although it shares the recognition and appreciation of the practices of parliamentary politics, it inverts the traditional perspective by focusing on its less obvious and less well-known aspects. Dissensus instead of consensus then becomes the raison d'être, the conceptual condition for the intelligibility of parliamentary politics. 8 The framework, the conceptual web, of this perspective is that of a constitutional liberal democracy with a strong, law-making, and responsible parliament, and with weak judicial review. Although this is a "novel perspective," the politics of dissensus draws on a distinguished tradition within political science and the history of ideas. It is deeply influenced by the understanding of politics expressed in the writings of Max Weber and Quentin Skinner. A basic premise to these authors is the dynamic and holistic character of politics, where no concepts, or point of view, including human rights, liberty or equality, are sacred and withdrawn from contextual interpretation. 9 According to the editors of The Politics of Dissensus, "for decades parliament's political centrality has been disregarded by democratic theory." 10 "Democratic theory," as the term is used here, points towards studies within political science that focus on existing forms of democratic deliberations, such as town meetings, worker-managed 5 organizations, and mini-publics, and conduct experiments with different deliberative set-ups.
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As a rule, these studies take consensus to be the core-concept of deliberation, and they look for the success-principles for obtaining this result in varying circumstances. Political dissensus maintains that these widespread attempts at spelling out the characteristics of deliberative democracy are politically inconsequential, as they do not provide models for the real and important political deliberation that takes place in parliamentary debates. 12 Consequently, they miss out one of the prerequisites for understanding politics, and thereby the very core of deliberative democracy. In their own words and with a historical touch: "Normative democratic theory, however, soon separated the idea of deliberative democracy from parliament (… ) thus depoliticising parliaments." 13 Although I am not going into the main features of democratic theory, the topic is complicated and demands a separate treatment, I would like to mention that the dialectic situation is delicate. Political dissensus uses "depoliticising" in a negative sense, while to democratic theory it is positively loaded. For the latter, it is crucial to preserve or save certain areas of human interaction and deliberation from politics, as it distrusts the power relations, the voting systems, and the external factors that typically influence on the verdicts made by the parliament. Such factors makes politics less rational and consensus-oriented than well-functioning deliberation aimed at truth, justice, or some other high non-political value.
14 It seems to me that when politics of dissensus introduces a distinction between "parliamentary politics" and "politics in parliament," part of the purpose is to separate two factors that they think are conflated in democratic theory. 15 In any case, at present, I focus exclusively on parliamentary politics.
The passage from the introduction to The Politics of Disensus, cited above, continues:
Certainly parliamentary politics is indebted to the rhetorical culture of addressing issues from opposite views and debating the alternatives pro et contra. In parliamentary 6 procedure dissensus and debate are institutionalised: no motion is approved without a thorough examination of and confrontation among imaginable alternatives.
16
To keep things simple and in line with the politics of dissensus, let us understand political deliberation as argumentation pro et contra. 17 Let us call the proposition or course of action that grounds the argumentation for "Pc" (standing for "Proposition/course of action under consideration"). The debaters pay (or appear to pay) due respect to the relevance and validity of the arguments that support or oppose a given Pc. 18 The debate is fair, according to some specification or another of this multifarious notion. 19 The debaters have (or argue as if they have) a common aim, namely to reach the just or best outcome in accordance with some independently fixed notions of "just" or "good." 20 It is important not to misunderstand this description in the direction of some given and ready-made criterion for judging the strength and weaknesses of an argument. In accordance with the Weberian and Skinnerian insights alluded to above, it is evident that no criterion is fixed and withdrawn from controversy and deliberation. 21 In real political debates taking place inside or outside the parliament, a consensus is the exception, not the rule:
Although the omnipresence of dissensus, conflict, controversy, dispute and debates in politics is widely acknowledged, they tend to be regarded in political institutions as provisional stages to be overcome in the final moment of decision-making. Our perspective turns the terms around to see final decisions as temporary de-actualizations of dissensus, whereas dissensual activities are taken as the heart of politics. Consensus is understood as a marginal case of dissensus, visible in moments such as, for instance, that it is better to agree upon some budget than none. Politics is, in other words, a quintessentially contingent and controversial activity (…) the guiding procedural Formulated differently, given that a focus on consensus makes politics into something it is not, and should not be, political liberalism does not debar politics. 24 Let me reformulate in light of a remark from The politics of Dissensus:
Parliamentarism establishes the openness of political debating, and its relying on an irreducible plurality of perspectives has become a distinctive historical contribution to the rise of parliamentary democracy.
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I am going to argue that "an irreducible plurality of perspectives" is a characterizing feature of political liberalism, due to the fact of reasonable pluralism. This stands in sharp contrast to most versions of comprehensive liberalism. 26 8
III: Deliberative Consensus versus Overlapping Consensus
Rosales maintains that "the most salient features of deliberative democratic theory" in Rawls's writings is to be found in the analysis of the deliberation that takes place in the analytic tool called "the Original Position" in A Theory of Justice. 27 The fall-out of the deliberation is the social conception of justice labelled "justice as fairness." 28 of real political debates, as they leave behind relevant aspects of parliamentary politics regulated by legislative procedures. 30 Rosales is certainly right in maintaining that although Habermas and Rawls inspire normative democratic theory, it goes beyond them in abstracting from the institutional frameworks at the basis of the normative theories of these authors. Rawls's work, as a whole, classifies as a branch of moral philosophy. 31 However, it is not the kind of normative thinking associated with democratic theory, namely attempts at re-describing, improving, or changing democratic political deliberation into genuine democratic deliberation. 32 The author of A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism never thought of new designs for deliberation, political or nonpolitical. Now, it might well be that to democratic theory Rawls's thought-experiment gives a paradigmatic ideal for a real deliberation about a deep normative issue, namely our basic social principles of justice. However, as this thought-experiment is not designed with the purpose of providing a model for deliberations in a democratic regime, it is arguable that Rosales and Rawls share the view that the term "deliberative" in "deliberative democracy" is not a pointer in the direction of a consensus-theory of deliberation.
After this clarification, let us turn to political liberalism. 33 This is a key-passage from
Political Liberalism:
The idea of an overlapping consensus is easily misunderstood given the idea of consensus in ordinary politics. Its meaning for us arises thus: we suppose a constitutional democratic regime to be reasonably just and workable, and worth defending. Yet given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can we frame our defence of it so that it can win sufficiently wide support to achieve stability. 34 It is urgent to warn against conflating consensus in ordinary politics and overlapping consensus.
Political consensus is deliberative consensus, and, according to the politics of dissensus, it is rare in well-functioning parliamentary regimes, while an overlapping consensus is not deliberative. The key-notion is that of reasonable pluralism within a constitutional democratic regime. This idea, maybe the single most important premise behind political liberalism, is that reasonable citizens in an industrial modern society disagree on fundamental issues, such as what the basic goods are and on how to live the best life, and, at the same time, realize that the others, with whom they disagree, are reasonable. 35 The fact of reasonable pluralism is grounded in the phenomenon that Rawls labels the "burdens of judgement." In order to explain this, Rawls proposes an open-ended, non-reducible list of elements that influence our judgements, containing such factors as the complexity and relative weighting of evidence, the vagueness of basic concepts, and our total experience. 36 In this light, it is unreasonable and certainly unwise to expect citizens to share one or just a few so-called comprehensive doctrines. 37 In short, political liberalism is a theory for a society and not a community. 38 An overlapping consensus is a consensus on a family of social conceptions of justice,
where each member satisfies a given, classically liberal list of conditions. 39 These conceptions furthermore "meet the criterion of reciprocity and recognise the burdens of judgment." 40 The criterion of reciprocity is defined as "when terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens." 41 Its purpose is to ensure that all citizens "as free and equal, can cooperate with each other on terms all can accept." 42 In this context, the fact of reasonable pluralism implies that in a well-ordered society, the citizens hold both a reasonable comprehensive (or partly comprehensive) doctrine and a social conception of justice. The relationship between these ideas might be as strong as a deductive one or as weak as coherence. 43 The basic point is that the citizens of a democratic regime work out for themselves 11 the relationship between their understanding of the basic goods and their political views and values. 44 A crucial factor for an appreciation of political liberalism is always to keep in mind that its starting point is from the inside of our common democratic tradition; all its key-concepts belong to this very tradition. The citizens view each other as free and equal citizens and they adopt or form a social conception of justice that respects this liberal and political value.
However, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine need not itself be liberal. It is to be expected that religious doctrines, for instance, prevail among citizens of such a regime. 45 Of course, helped by fellow citizens reasoning from conjecture, one might come to realize that a reasonable liberal political conception of justice follows from, or is coherent with one's higher or nonpolitical values, but, again, this is not deliberation. 46 At present, my moderate aim is to make clear that an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable social conceptions of justice is not, and cannot be, the result of a deliberation, but concern the relation between a social conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine. In this light, it seems as if the politics of dissensus can and should appreciate the burdens of judgement and the fact of reasonable pluralism, as they provide a foundation for the fact that it is unreasonable to expect consensus in political deliberation in a well-ordered society. As a partial vindication of this assumption, I
would like to cite a remark from one of the contributors to The Politics of Dissensus, Enrico
Biale, who defends a complex conceptualization of compromise:
In a pluralistic society that includes people with different, and sometimes conflicting, opinions, preferences, and ideals, it is reasonable to assume that there will be disagreements regarding these important issues. Moreover, although members of a pluralistic society acknowledge one another as free and equal, they do not necessarily agree on principles of justice that could provide a shared standard against which to assess political proposals or laws and policies (the input and output, respectively, of the decision-making process).
Even if the citizens share principles of justice, they would disagree on their interpretation and the best way to implement these principles. 47 Biale's observations capture nicely basic facts of political liberalism. The reasonable citizens will hold one of a number of conflicting social conceptions of justice, and none of these conceptions is self-interpretable. Accordingly, conflicting views might prevail among defenders of the same conception. There is an additional feature to be taken into consideration, namely that those who hold the same comprehensive doctrine, need not agree to exactly the same social conception of justice. All this means that the burdens of judgement must always be taken into account when we reflect on political issues and political judgements. (If this sounds like a kind of relativism, we must not forget that the criterion of reciprocity and the associated understanding of the reasonable secure the needed bulwark.)
IV: Political Liberalism and Dissensus
In Political Liberalism, there is one comment that appears to go against the very idea of politics, in particular. It comes as the third element of Rawls's explanation of the notion of social unity: 48 Public political discussion, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, are always, or nearly always, reasonably decidable on the basis of reasons specified by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice, one of which is for each citizen the most (more) reasonable. Political values form part of the content of public reason. 52 This means that even when political deliberation is limited to public reason, that is, is grounded on arguments derived from social conceptions of justice, dissensus prevails. The exception might be basic questions essential to the very core of our idea of democracy. The ideal of public debate is that it is restricted to the principle of reciprocity and that the debaters follow the moral duty of civility. 53 Therefore, it would be preferable that all, or close to all, political questions debated in parliament are treated in light of public reason and its values. 54 However, to repeat, this is not to say that such issues would be settled by consensus. 55 I think Anthoula Malkopoulou gives voice to a common misreading of Rawls, early and late, when she, from the perspective of the politics of dissensus, writes that:
If we side with the rhetorical or parliamentary approach to deliberation, then subjective reason, perspectivism and disagreement become a sine quo non of political discussion.
To the contrary, the Rawlsian and Habermasian variants of deliberative democracy are rather at odds with this idea, as they place emphasis on justice and consensus respectively. Even if they accept that a political discussion may not always lead to agreement, deliberative judgement still has a clear priority over will. But, talking to our interlocutors and expecting them to accept our opinions merely because they are 'reasonable' may betray less than horizontal approach to political discussions than the deliberativists would like to admit. 56 
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First, we have seen that the consensus of "overlapping consensus" is not a political consensus, or the end-point of a deliberation. Therefore, on this point no clear disagreement is detectable.
The question that remains concerns the scope of reason. If Malkopoulou by "subjective reasons"
means "all kinds of personal reasons," including "religious reasons" and "reasons due to personal experience," then there is a clear difference between her positions and that of political liberalism, with its restriction of parliamentary debate to public reason. (But, consider note 20 and the discussion leading up to it.) However, this difference does not concern the logic of deliberation.
Another misunderstanding is that Malkopoulou ascribes to Rawls the idea that a reasonable person expects her interlocutors to agree with her because they are reasonable, as well. However, it is exactly the other way around. To be a reasonable person is to realize that there are limits to what can be reasonable justified to others. When serious political and moral issues are at stake, the reasonable person does not expect, but of course, she hopes, that other reasonable persons will agree with her. 57 In fact, to accept that other reasonable persons disagree However, disputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead to a stand-off between different political conceptions, and citizens must simply vote on the question. Indeed, this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected. Reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion (…) nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular issues. 59 In general, prevalent reasonable doctrines and the family of social conceptions of justice belonging to the overlapping consensus do not decide political issues. Rawls discusses in some detail the cluster of complex and demanding issues concerning the family and its structure. He demonstrates that political liberalism has no saying on these issues, with the exception of the considerably weak claim that they must be decided within the framework of the constitutional essentials. 60 We might specify citizens in the direction of representatives in the passage just cited, and then we have a case of dissensus and a verdict made by the force of the majority.
The second passage makes a point about the positive value of disagreement.
[T]he ideal of public reason does not often lead to general agreements of views, nor should it. Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct and deepen society's public culture. 61 This echoes some basic ideas in J.S. Mill's On Liberty. Unresolved disagreement, i.e., dissensus -especially in cases where the arguments are guided by public reason -is valuable.
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I am not alone in taking Rawls to be a scholar that values politics and does not want to get rid of it. This is Joshua Cohen's apt formulation:
[I]n his political liberalism, Rawls embraces the deliberative conception of democratic politics while also accepting that, even under the best circumstances we can reasonable hope for, members of a democratic society will disagree with one another about what justice requires (…) politics is, in the first instance, a matter of deliberation: of citizens and representatives defending laws and policies by reference to reasons drawn from a conception of justice that they might reasonably expect others to endorse. 63 Cohen, as I, takes the ideal that for a deliberation to be successful, it ends in consensus, to be an idea of democratic theory that does not belong to political liberalism. I discuss this topic in the next and final part.
V: The Conversational Model and Normativity
In his chapter in Toscano forcefully argues that this model is not appropriate for actual parliamentary debates, which typically take place among adversaries. 64 For the sake of the argument, let us assume that deliberations in the parliament in a well-ordered society pay due respect to the three featuresbut for reasons that will become evident, let us rephrase the third as "3) dialogue is understood as an enterprise where only 'the force of the better argument' matters." One might think that given these normative constraints, in the normal case the decisions made by such a parliament are consensus-based. However, this conclusion is unwarranted. On the contrary, in this hypothetical and idealized situation, the basic insight of the politics of dissensus still holds; that is to say, the parliamentary debates typically take place among adversaries. 65 This becomes clear from some reflections on how to understand the phrase "the force of the better argument" from the point of view of political liberalism. Assume that we have a paradigmatic case of argumentation pro et contra, where one member of the parliament argues in favour of Pc, and another argues against Pc, neither argues for personal gain or suchlike, and both regard the other as equal. Assume furthermore that it is shared knowledge between the two contenders that this is the case. These representatives subscribe to the full conversational model. However, and this is the decisive point, they might be aware of the fact that the attempt at persuading the other, likewise reasonable and rational representative, is on all counts a lost case. In such a situation, which I gather would be quite common in the well-ordered regime, the two debaters are adversaries: they cannot agree and at most, one of them wins; that is, unless a bearable compromise is reached. 66 It follows that if the conversational model is taken to be a model for reaching consensus in debates, it is too idealistic to fit parliamentary debates in a well-ordered society. However, if one rejects, as political liberalism does, the naïve and anti-political assumption that the "force of the best argument" means that there always or normally is such an argument available, then, as argued, political liberalism displays a model for the logic and limits of deliberation, and not a model for consensus. This is because when underlying presuppositions about reason and rationality are brought to light, it is evident that the conversational model does not imply that a failure to reach a consensus indicates either that one or more of the debaters do not accept the model, or that they should continue debating until a consensus is established. This shows that there is no tension between political liberalism and the slightly modified conversational model of deliberation, on the one hand, and the politics of dissensus on the other.
Allow me to formulate an empirically refutable conjecture concerning parliamentary politics. Political liberalism starts out from inside our existing, but not fully well-ordered, constitutional democracies. It takes these to be the result of contingent historical processes that involve both material and conceptual factors, including a refined awareness among the members of the parliament of the kinds of arguments that are appropriate to their office. I conjecture that if one undertook a diachronic parliamentary study of the kinds of arguments used in a selected group of parliaments, say the Scandinavian ones, over a time-span of the last 50 years, one would find that they tend to become restricted to social conceptions of justice, and presented as self-standing and independent of comprehensive doctrines. Such a study would be highly instructive, and throw light on our speculations about the origin and continuous development of political liberalism and parliamentary politics.
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Let me close off with a final observation. A major point behind politics of dissensus is to push back moralism of all kinds. 67 A defender of this approach towards political philosophy could maintain that political liberalism fails in that it starts out from an ideal picture of citizens and members of parliament as rational and reasonable, and that it is therefore founded on moralistic presuppositions. This vision of a citizen and a representative, however, is not nearly as substantial as those one regularly encounters in normative political theory, be it democracy theory, contract-theory, communitarianism, or critical theory in the hands of Habermas or Honneth, or Marxism. To refuse to take into account normative assumptions on the human being and better or worse forms of deliberation would be to reject normative political theory in all its branches. I do not think that the politics of dissensus is meant to be an exclusively descriptive project, for in that case, it is hard to see how it might have a bearing on the pressing political issues of the present day.
